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pelling" interest of protecting the union minority from being required
to contribute to causes which they as individuals would not have sup-
ported. There is no valid justification for deterring the union members
from freely associating for the furtherance of expressing their political
preferences. Where the "compelling" interest upon which the regula-
tion is supposedly justified lacks substantial foundation, the constitu-
tionality of section 610 as interpreted and applied in Pipe fitters is
questionable.*
DANIEL . J. GRIFFIN JR.
Admiralty—Limitation on Sovereign Immunity—Governmental Li-
ability for Negligent Misrepresentation—De Bardeleben Marine
Corp. v. United States.'--Plaintiff tugboat owner was commissioned
by Coyle Lines on February 8, 1964, to anchor two barges off a Tampa
dock and to retrieve them the next day. In the process of removal, the an-
chor of one of the barges ruptured a submerged natural gas pipeline. The
resulting fire and explosion caused damage to the tugboat and both barges
and inflicted personal injuries on the crew. The presence of the pipeline
was first noted in Weekly Notice to Mariners of March 16, 1963. Its
location was then marked on the Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart
issued September 16, 1963.2 Notice of issuance of this corrected map
was subsequently published in Weekly Notice to Mariners of October
19, 1963. None of these publications, however, was aboard the tug.
The chart that was aboard, dated December 17, 1962, was officially
stamped "Corrected through Weekly Notice of July 20, 1963." Though
stamped as corrected, this chart did not include the location of the pipe-
line. The tugboat owner brought suit' under the Suits in Admiralty Act
(SIA),4 alleging that the issuance of the faulty chart constituted negli-
gent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. In the district court,
both parties were found negligent and the damages were apportioned.'
* Subsequent to submission of this article for publication, Pipefitters was reversed by
the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 40 U.S.L.W. 4781
(U.S. June 22, 1972). The Court held, inter ails, that 18 U.S.C. § 610 does not prohibit
union contributions and expenditures from a political fund financed by voluntary donations
of members. The Court also held that such a fund need not be separate from the union
but must be strictly segregated from the union dues and assessments.
1 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971),
2
 These notices are issued in accordance with 33 C.F.R. § 72.01-1 (1971), which states:
"Through the means of Notices to Mariners, the Coast Guard disseminates information
concerning establishments, changes, discontinuances, and certain deficiencies in operation
of aides to navigation maintained by and under the authority of the Commandant."
These regulations, issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C. H 883(a)-(d) (1970), authorize the
collection and dissemination of maritime data for the purpose of alerting mariners to new
hazards and changes in the navigable waters of the United States.
a No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept, 8, 1971).
4 46 U.S.C. § 741-52 (1970).
5 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971). In applying a comparative theory of tort
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The court did not reach the breach of warranty contentions. On the
Government's appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals HELD: the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was not a bar to Governmental liability
in actions under the SIA. The court went on, however, to hold that, as a
matter of tort law, the Government's liability for the issuance of a
faulty chart ceased after a period of time during which a reasonable
mariner would have received a Weekly Notice advising him of the
publication of a chart correctly placing the pipeline.°
The threshold and focal issue in the decision arose from the Gov-
ernment's defense of sovereign immunity.? The De Bardeleben court
was confronted with the Government's contention that Congress had
intended the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claim Act's (FTCA) waiver
of sovereign immunity8 to apply to all claims brought under the SIA
as amended in 1960. Therefore, the Government argued, the court
lacked the requisite jurisdiction to hear the merits of a negligent mis-
representation claim under the SIA. Conversely, the plaintiff contended
that the limitations in causes of action of the FTCA were not to be
construed as being applicable to the SIA. The court, in upholding the
plaintiff's interpretation of the threshold jurisdictional question, relied
on an analysis of the statutory language, the legislative history and the
concomitant case law. This casenote will examine the court's logic in
view of present trends of judicial liberality toward sovereign liability.
It will also submit that this decision is consistent with those trends.
Before 1960 no statute provided plaintiffs with a remedy for mis-
representation by the federal government. The FTCA specifically ex-
cluded misrepresentation from those claims that could be made against
liability, the court determined that De Bardeleben was liable for 75% of the damages and
the Government was liable for 25%.
0 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971).
7 Once the court resolved the important question regarding the re-importation of the
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity of the FTCA into the SIA, it considered
two other issues. First, it determined that the maritime questions were of a national rather
than local nature, and therefore were to be governed by federal rather than state law.
Second, it decided that federal law should impose a duty of care in the preparation and
dissemination of charts and notices but that the duty should be imposed only for a period
of time measured by a standard of reasonableness. Hence, after finding the facts in this
case, the court held that plaintiff relied upon the governmental charts for longer than a
reasonable time. Thus the Government was not legally responsible for reliance upon its
charts beyond that period.
8 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) provides that the United States is not liable for "any
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights." These exceptions considerably narrow what would otherwise be complete exposure
to tort liability as given by the general waiver of sovereign immunity, which provides as
follows:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating
to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
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the United States.° Similarly, the original SIA did not encompass many
traditional actions in tort. It provided that, "In cases where if such
vessels were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were
privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be
maintained ... ,"1 ° and thus its scope was restricted to actions wherein
the immediate target of the claim was a ship or cargo. Thus, an action
for misrepresentation could not be framed under the original Act be-
cause a "vessel" or "cargo" could not make a misrepresentation.
In 1960 the SIA was amended to read: "In cases where if such
vessel were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or
property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be main-
tained .. . ."" The plaintiff's suit in De Bardeleben was initiated pur-
suant to this new statute and put clearly in issue the question whether
the addition of the words "or if a private person or property were in-
volved" substantively enlarged the scope of governmental liability.
Under the old language, the Government's liability as defendant in ad-
miralty was tantamount to that of a private defendant only in causes of
action involving "cargo" or a "vessel." But under the language of the
1960 amendment, the plaintiff contended, the liability of the govern-
ment in admiralty was expanded to include liability for any tort action
that could be brought against private individuals. The Government,
however, contended that even if the 1960 amendment could be so inter-
preted, the SIA was still subject to the jurisdictional limitations
imposed by the FTCA. Specifically, the Government asserted that the
FTCA provision excluding liability for misrepresentation' ruled out
an interpretation of the 1960 amendment that would allow such liability
in admiralty actions. Refuting these contentions, the De Bardeleben
court interpreted the clause "or if a private person or property were
involved" to include all actions against the United States that could be
brought against a private individual.
There are two principal suppositions that buttress the court's posi-
tion. The first is that the 1960 Amendment to the Suits and Admiralty
Act itself was meant to limit waivers of sovereign immunity. The sec-
ond is that the judicial trend is away from sovereign immunity and
that, by analogy, sovereign immunity in this case should be restricted.
The court utilized the "plain meaning" technique of statutory
construction. The terms of the SIA; the court concluded, when read by
themselves, constitute an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity
for all actions in admiralty. The court recognized that such a broad
waiver is neither unprecedented, nor so unusual as to reject its obvious
construction. The federal government has frequently waived the tradi-
tional immunity, the FTCA being an obvious example. The court indi-
cated that the Government's attempt to alter the plain meaning of the 
9 28 U.S.C. g 2680(h) (1970). The text of this section is quoted in pertinent part, in
note S supra.
10 46 U.S.C.	 742 (1958).
11 46 U.S.C. {1 742 (1970) (Emphasis added).
12 See note 8 supra.
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statute, by its contention that the FTCA exceptions were applicable by
analogy to the amended SIA, bears a heavy burden of persuasion."
Thus, in ascertaining the scope of potential governmental liability, the
court examined the legislative history and the circumstances surround-
ing the amendment to the SIA.
The De Bardeleben court noted that the basic purpose of the 1960
amendment, as evidenced by its legislative history, was to adjust the
partial jurisdictional overlap of the SIA and the FTCA." Because of
confusing language in the original SIA, suits were often erroneously
filed under one statute in either the Court of Claims or the District
Court and subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds. It was then
often too late to file the suit under the correct statute in the proper
court." In order to remedy the injustice of these dismissals, Congress
passed the 1960 Amendment to the SIA. The first two sections permit
the transfer of a case from either court to the other." The third section
substantively broadens the jurisdictional limits of the district courts to
include actions against the United States involving "persons" or "prop-
erty."" That claims such as the one at issue in De Bardeleben were to be
13 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971).
14 Prior to amendment, the SIA provided that a "proceeding in personam may be
brought against the United States or against any corporation mentioned in section 741 of
this title. Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States .. . ." 46
U.S.C. § 742 (1958).
The FTCA provides that:
[The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims, of: . . . (2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States,
not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any ex-
press or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
The partial overlap arose in cases where claims exceeded $10,000 and where there
was uncertainty as to whether the nature of the case was in admiralty or in law. The
initial pleadings were often instrumental in conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a particular
court. Thus, if a claim exceeding $10,000 were framed in admiralty under the SIA, the
district courts had exclusive jurisdiction; whereas, if the action were framed in law under
the FTCA, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. Unfortunately, since judges
and lawyers frequently differed as to the applicability of the facts to the alternative
statutory authorities, there was uncertainty as to whether a suit was properly brought
under the SIA or the FTCA. Since cases were not transferable between the district courts
and the Court of Claims, an inappropriate choice often resulted in a complete bar to the
action if the statute of limitations had run on the claim.
15 It should be noted that the statute of limitations provision of the FTCA is six
years (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1970)), while the statute of limitations of the SIA is only
two years (46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970)).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970) provides:
If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is filed in a
district court, the district court shall, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such cases to the Court of Claims, where the case shall proceed as if it had been
filed in the Court of Claims on the date it was filed in the district court.
Similar statutory language allows the transfer of a cause of action from the Court of
Claims to the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970).
17 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970), quoted in pertinent part at p. 1548 supra.
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included, the court stated, is apparent from an excerpt from the Senate
Report which stated:
Itlhe purpose of the amendment is to make certain as possible
that suits brought against the United States for damages
caused by vessels and employees of the United States through
breach of contract or tort can be originally filed in the correct
court so as to proceed to trial promptly on their merits."
The court concluded that the intent behind the language was to include
all actions under the SIA and not just those claims which previously fell
within the overlapping jurisdiction of both statutes. If the latter were
true, it is submitted that the legislature could have better achieved this
result by delineating the type of claim permitted in each court. There-
fore, it follows that the legislative intendment was to extend the Gov-
ernment's liability to include all possible actions under the SIA.
Since there is little direct congressional comment on the theory of
incorporation of the FTCA exceptions into the SIA, the court turned to
judicial determinations of questions analogous to the instant issue. For
instance, there are a few decisions which have negated efforts to in-
corporate the FTCA exceptions into the admiralty side of the court.
Some of the claims permitted in admiralty have included those arising
in a foreign country," and those arising out of slander, libel or false
imprisonment." Had the exceptions of the FTCA been held to apply
to the SIA, these claims would have been specifically barred.
In support of its position that the sections of the FTCA are ap-
plicable in construing the scope of the SIA, the Government, in its brief
to the De Bardeleben court, relied extensively on the Supreme Court
decision in Amell v. United States.". In that case, governmental em-
ployees who were mariners brought suit under the SIA for back wages.
The SIA has a two year statute of limitations. Non-maritime govern-
mental employees were privilegd to bring suit for back wages under the
FTCA since its statute of limitations period extends six years. The Su-
preme Court, in effect, held that the statute of limitations of the FTCA
should be incorporated into the SIA so that the latter could accommo-
date the claims filed by governmental employees who were also ma-
riners. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, the mariner employees would be
discriminated against merely because they were mariners. The Court
felt that compensation "should be fixed in a uniform manner for all
government wage-board employees, whether seamen or not." 22
 It is
obvious that the Supreme Court was more concerned with establishing
a uniform federal policy than with specifically incorporating provisions
of the FTCA into the SIA. Thus, the result of the Amell case does not
18 S. Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3583 (1960).
10 United States v. Motor Ship Hoyanger, 265 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
20 Foster v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
21 384 U.S. 158 (1966).
22 Id. at 163.
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compel in toto incorporation of the provisions and exceptions of the
FTCA absent strong policy considerations. Indeed, the De Bardeleben
court recognized that the Amell case was not controlling."
It is helpful to note that the practice of construing waivers of
sovereign immunity broadly has been used widely in other questions
involving the interpretation of the FTCA exceptions. For example, the
"discretionary function" exception of the FTCA" could potentially
provide umbrella immunity to the Government for the acts of its agents.
However, the courts have not been disposed to employ this section as
a broad barrier to governmental liability. Indeed, in some cases the
courts have flatly refused to read the "discretionary function" excep-
tion into the waiver of sovereign immunity. In Jemison v. The Duplex, 25
an action was brought by a wharf owner against the United States
under the FTCA for negligent prepartion of a dredging chart by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers. The Government argued that
the chart was made at a discretionary; level because it indicated govern-
ment policy. In rejecting this argument and holding the Government
liable, the court stated, "the United ',States Engineers were not given
carte blanche to draft plans and specifications for the dredging opera-
tions in negligent disregard for the rights of property owners along the
shore."26 In other cases, the courts have avoided the application of the
"discretionary function" exception by labeling many tasks as "opera-
tional" in nature, thus subjecting the Government to liability for their
negligent performance. The test for distinguishing "discretionary"
from "operational" negligence" has been stringently construed in favor
of the latter, thereby exposing many phases of governmental activity
to liability."
23 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971).
24 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
eminent, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, tor based upon the exercise or perfor-
mance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
25 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
26 Id. at 951.
27 The test was clearly formulated in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Therein, an action against the United States was commenced under the FTCA for a death
resulting from an explosion of a chemical produced according to the specifications of the
Government. The Court found that the accident occurred because of negligence on the
part of the Government in adopting the particular chemical program. Therefore, it held
that no liability could attach because of the discretionary function exception found in
28 U.S.. § 2680(a) (1970). The test developed to distinguish between discretionary and
operational functions is: "where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion." Id. at 35.
28 See Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951) (mark-
ing wrecked vessels) ; Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968)
(issuing charts designating lighted airfields) ; Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co.,
1551,
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Another illustration of the modern tendency of broadly inter-
preting waivers of immunity is the courts' treatment of the FTCA
provision that, "The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.'
Traditionally, sovereigns have escaped liability for a negligent act
when that act was one that could be performed only by a sovereign
and not by an individual." However, in recent decisions the courts have
avoided that narrow construction of the provision. It has been held that
certain functions, even if "uniquely governmental" in nature, will im-
pose liability on the government if negligently performed. For example,
in Indian Towing Co. v. United States
'
 the Government was held li-
able for the negligent operation of a lighthouse. The Court reasoned
that the governmental-nongovernmental distinction served no legiti-
mate purpose in this context." Rather, the statutory scheme was de-
signed to compensate victims of negligence. Thus, it is clear from this
case that the emphasis is on reaching equitable results for the injured
and not on constricting the scope of governmental liability.
A very extreme example of liberal construction of a waiver of
sovereign immunity is to be found in United States v. Muniz.33
 In that
case, a federal prisoner was permitted to sue prison officials for negli-
gently failing to provide enough guards to prevent an assault upon him.
The Court held that the Government's liability was no longer restricted
to circumstances in which Government bodies, bad been traditionally
responsible for misconduct of their employees." In so holding, the
Court extended federal court jurisdiction to unprecedented cases. The
implications of this decision for the case at bar are twofold.. Firs
_ it
demonstrates that waivers of sovereign immunity are liberally con-
strued and, second, it sets a precedent for bringing new causes of action
within the scope of the SIA where previously they had not been allowed.
Once it has been decided that the amendment to the SIA had been
added to enlarge substantially the scope of the Government's liability
and that it is not to be limited by the restriction of the FTCA, there
remains another great conceptual difficulty. That difficulty is the de-
termination of whether all maritime torts are to be. included within the
scope of the statute or whether it merely encompasses those torts tradi-
tionally related to admiralty—that is, causes of action relating only to
"cargo" or "vessel" claims. If the latter interpretation were followed,
221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir, 1955) (issuing information about flight patterns and operating
control towers).
29 28 U.S.C. §.2674 (1970).
80
 E.g., in Harris v.. District of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650 (1921), the Supreme Court
held that a municipal corporation was not liable for negligently sprinkling its streets be-
cause the activity was a uniquely governmental function.
81 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
82 Id. at 65.
aa 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
84 Id. at 159.
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misrepresentation claims would remain barred by the provisions and
exceptions found in the FTCA.
In considering this question, the De Bardeleben court found no
uniform response in the case law. In Utzinger v. United States," a
federal district court decided that the waiver of immunity is broad
enough to include the whole gamut of maritime torts. There, a private
pleasure craft collided with a loading dock negligently abandoned by
the United States Government. In holding that the case correctly fell
within the jurisdiction of the SIA, the court stated that, "If the tort
occurred on navigable waters, the claim is one that lies within the juris-
diction of admiralty; nothing more is required.' 86
Thus, the Utzinger court's sole concern in determining its jurisdic-
tion was the situs of the tort rather than whether the particular action
involved "cargo" or "vessels." It is clear that the 1960 amendment to
the SIA broadened the jurisdiction of the district courts to hear claims
involving maritime torts which previously had to be filed under the
FTCA." The policy of allowing new suits under the SIA or, alternately,
of viewing the waiver of immunity as broader than that of the FTCA,
is also recognized in opinions other than Utzinger."
- In contrast to the liberal definition of "maritime tort" adopted
by the Utzinger court is the view espoused in J.W. Peterson Coal
& Oil Co. v. United States." In that case, the plaintiff dock
owner filed suit against the United States for negligent dredging
operations that resulted in the collapse of his dock. In overruling
a Government motion that the suit had to be brought in admiralty,
the federal district court reasoned that the Government's involve-
ment as far as a "public vessel" or "cargo" was concerned was
too uncertain to conclude that a remedy is provided under the SIA."
The suit had to be maintained under the FTCA. Thus the court
restrictively interpreted the phrase "or if a private person or prop-
erty were involved" as not constituting an enlargement of Gov-
ernment liability under the SIA. Rather, the Peterson court indicated
that the addition of the phrase was intended to:
35 246 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1965).
89 Id. at 1023, quoting Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 761 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
57 See Beeler v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1966), in which plaintiff
sued the United States for injuries incurred when her boat was swept over a dam. She
claimed that the accident was caused by the negligence of the Corps of Engineers in lo-
cating signs warning of the hazard. The question at issue was whether the jurisdiction was
under the FTCA or the SM. The court held that since the 1960 amendment to the SIA,
suits such as the one at bar, even though previously not permitted, are not maintainable
under the SM. Id. at 776.
as E.g., in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States (P.O.D.), 1948 A.M.C.
267 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) the court stated in general terms, "it seems ... that the language
of the Suits in Admiralty Act is much broader than that found in the Federal Tort
Claims Act." Id. at 268-69. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 407 F.2d 24
(5th Cir. 1969).
89 323 F. Supp. 1198 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
49 Id. at 1200.
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(1) avoid the technical distinction of when goods owned by
the Government to be carried on a vessel have ceased to be
`merchandise' and have become 'cargo' .
(2) confirm that the Act was not limited to cases where prior
to it the Government vessel could have been seized in rem
but went farther and gave a remedy in personam against the
United States both in cases where only the vessel would be
liable and in those cases where the owner of the vessel, if
privately owned, would be personally liable .. .
(3) lay to rest the notion that the Government's ownership
of cargo must be directly connected with the Government's
ownership and operation of a vessel. . . 4 1
Consequently, the court concluded that unless the vessel were owned
or operated by or for the United States there would be no remedy avail-
able under the SIA.
Thus, there exists a fundamental conflict concerning the meaning
of "maritime torts" within the SIA. It seems that in attempting to
abolish the overlap of jurisdiction between the original SIA and FTCA,
Congress has created another overlap between the amended SIA and
Section 1346(b) of the FTCA." That is, claims which, because of the
controversy just discussed, cannot be definitely characterized as mari-
time or non-maritime can presumably be filed under either statute, de-
pending upon the court's definition of "maritime tort." The choice of
the proper act upon which to ground the claim is obviously critical, for
an incorrect choice could lead to dismissal." The De Bardeleben court,
by permitting suit under the SIA, sanctioned the broader concept of
"maritime torts." Indeed, it is the more logical decision in light of the
liberal context in which waivers of sovereign immunity are construed.
If De Bardeleben had been decided to the contrary, the re-incorpo-
ration of the FTCA provisions and exceptions could, in some instances,
have led to inconsistencies in the application of the SIA. Before 1960,
virtually unlimited liability had been imposed upon the United States
for torts in admiralty that would have fallen within the FTCA excep-
tion of "discretionary function." For example, the operation of a naval
vessel in wartime, although quite discretionary, was included in ad-
41
 Id. at 1204.
42 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (1970) states:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts together
with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
43 See 2 F. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims 257 (1964).
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miralty." As the De Bardeleben court emphasized, the policy behind
these decisions was that congressional adoption of broad statutory
language authorizing suit was deliberate and was not to be thwarted
by unduly restrictive interpretation." If, however, the discretionary
exceptions were to be re-imported into the 1960 amendment this would
mean that suits previously permitted would be barred. Such result was
neither intended nor desired by the legislature.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that inconsistency in ad-
ministrative accountability would result from a failure to re-import
the exceptions into the SIA. For example, under the FTCA, govern-
mental agencies would not be liable for misrepresentation, as long as it
was not made in a maritime context." Moreover, the same govern-
mental agency involved in the De Bardeleben decision—the Coast and
Geodetic Survey—would escape liability for a misrepresentation that
resulted in a non-maritime accident. 47 It is arguable, then, that mari-
time and non-maritime misrepresentation should be treated consistently
unless good reason exists for distinguishing the two. It is suggested that
remedial legislation is necessary to resolve the inconsistencies in gov-
ernmental liability for misrepresentation.
In conclusion, the result reached by the De Bardeleben court is
highly tenable. The court employed an analysis of the language and the
legislative history of the FTCA and the SIA. Additionally it examined
the general trends in the law of sovereign immunity and drew consistent
parallels thereto. The De Bardeleben court also considered the con-
ceptual implications of the decision in terms of related problems such
as a specific definition of "maritime tort." These considerations ob-
viously were weighed against the alternative solutions discussed herein
and it is submitted that the court made the most prudent decision in
light of the relevant case law.
RICHARD M. WHITING
44 DeBardelbew Marine Corp. v. United States of America, No. 29,360 (5th Cir.,
Sept. 8, 1971) at 13 n.15 citing Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215
(1945).
46 Id. at 222.
46 See Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (unsuccessful
suit against the United States for misrepresentation on government chart that caused
explosion of pipeline under the earth).
47 See Jones v. United States, 207 F.2d .563 (2d Cir. 1953), where the Government
was held not liable for misrepresentation on a Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart that
misstated the oil producing capacity of a certain tract of land and caused financial loss
to those who relied thereon.
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